奎因 《信念网》全新译本 连载（1）

这是奎因1994年赠送给我的两本书：Web of Beliefs（《信念网》）和Quiddities（《短论集》）。

【最近从商务印书馆传来好消息。我主译的《奎因自传》一书即将于2025年3-4月份出版。进一步地，我翻译的《信念网》一书也将在该出版社出版。《信念网》2007年曾在人大出版社出版过。趁此再版机会，我将对译文做一次认真的修订。以下是本书序言和前两章的经过校订的译稿。欢迎各位朋友提出宝贵意见！】

目录

序言（v）

第一章  导言（3）

第二章  信念和信念的改变（9）

第三章  观察（20）

第四章  自明性（35）

第五章  证言（50）

第六章  假说（64）

第七章  归纳、类比和直觉（83）

第八章  确认和反驳（96）

第九章  解释（108）

第十章  说服和评价（125）

推荐读物（139）131

专业词汇表（142）133

索引（145）

Preface

序言

[v] This little book is a compact introduction to the study of rational belief. It is meant to afford a coherent view of a broad philosophical terrain, providing points of entry to such areas of philosophy as theory of knowledge, methodology of science, and philosophy of language.

[v][1]这本小书将简明地讨论理性信念这一课题。它将通过一个连贯的视野，引领读者进入包括知识论、科学方法论和语言哲学在内的广大的哲学领域。

It was commissioned eleven years ago for inclusion in a series intended for freshman courses in English. The first edition appeared in 1970. To our surprise it made its way mainly into introductory philosophy courses. Revising it in the light of this trend, we have at points allowed ourselves a more frankly philosophical tone than before and have developed philosophical themes a little further. We have been able to assume that our readers will be more tolerant of philosophical lucubrations than we dared assume before. We have aimed still at undergraduates generally, regardless of department, and have presupposed no philosophical training. But we have tried to encourage interest in philosophy.

我们最早受委托写这本书是在11年前[2]。当时它被计划用做大一英语丛书的一种。它初版于1970年。出乎我们的预料，它主要被用做入门性哲学课程的教材。考虑到这一情况，修订版在一些地方放手加重了哲学色彩，对哲学话题的讨论也有所加深。我们在这样做时是在假定，这本书的读者的哲学钻研精神比我们最初预期的要强。修订版的目标读者仍是普通的本科生，没有专业限制，也不要求之前接受过哲学训练。但我们希望，我们的这本书能激发读者对哲学的兴趣。

[vi] The book is a little longer than before, and almost half of it is rewritten. The most central chapter, “Hypothesis,” has been reorganized and tightened. The chapter on Explanation has been almost wholly rewritten, to present a less perfunctory doctrine than before. Five pages have been added on Evaluation, a topic previously touched only lightly. Paragraphs sparked by the latter-day resurgence of irrationalism have found their way into the new Introduction and into various of the subsequent chapters. Many passages have been revised for enhancement of clarity. A Glossary and an Index have been added.

[vi] 修订版比初版要略长一些，几乎有一半的内容经过了重写。最核心的“假说”一章经过重组，变得更加紧凑了。“解释”一章几乎全部是重写的，对该话题的处理更加严谨了。“评价”部分增加了5页，初版对这个话题的处理只是点到为止。为了回击近来甚嚣尘上的反理性主义，我们在新增加的“导言”一章和后续各章中都增加了一些段落。为增加清晰性，我们对许多段落做了修订。另外，修订版还增设了专业词汇表和索引。

We are grateful to Professors J. J. C. Smart and Edwin Martin, Jr. for helpful criticism of several points in the first edition. And we are indebted most particularly to Professor Douglas Stalker, who provided us with a constructive and painstaking criticism of the first edition, much of it page by page. He had been teaching from the book, and his penetrating comments and suggestions revealed remarkable pedagogical gifts and dedication as well as sound philosophy. Much of our revision was guided by his comments. Of equal importance, in spurring us to new efforts, was simply the awareness that our little book was receiving such serious and respectful scrutiny in so competent a quarter.

我们要感谢J. J. C. 斯马特教授和小埃德温·马丁教授对初版好几处的批评意见。我们要特别感谢曾经一直使用本书做教材的道格拉斯·斯托克教授；他对初版提出了详尽而建设性的批评，许多意见都精确到了具体的段落。他的深刻评论和建议不仅展现了他的非凡教学才能和敬业精神，也显示了他的扎实哲学素养。许多修订都是在他的评论的指导下进行的。这本小书在专业领域内竟得到如此令人肃然起敬的审视，意识到这一点对于促成我们新的努力是同样重要的。

W. V. 奎因

J. S. 厄里安

Chapter I - INTRODUCTION

第一章  导言

【译者导读：科学的本质是理性探究，即对逻辑的明智运用。科学以追求真理为己任，但科学的结论却是可错的，即它们在不利的证据面前应该被抛弃或修改。与之形成对比的是，伪科学声称它们能提供问题的终极答案，从而能一劳永逸地解除人们的焦虑；但这不过是骗子的骗术或无知者的幻想罢了。】

[3] Our word "science" comes from a Latin word for knowledge. Much that we know does not count as science, but this is often less due to its subject matter than to its arrangement. For nearly any body of knowledge that is sufficiently organized to exhibit appropriate evidential relationships among its constituent claims has at least some call to be seen as scientific. What makes for science is system, whatever the subject. And what makes for system is the judicious application of logic. Science is thus a fruit of rational investigation.

[3]“科学”一词源自拉丁词[3]，意为知识。许多知识不能算做科学，其原因常常不在于它的题材，而在于它的结构。几乎任何知识体系，只要它是被充分组织的，并显示出了其主张的各个部分之间的适当的证据关系，就至少有几分理由被认为是科学的。科学的本质在于系统性，无论其题材是什么。而系统性则在于对逻辑的明智运用。所以，科学是理性探究的产物。

The scientific community is no private club. In principle, and in the best and broadest sense of the words, scientific inquiry can be undertaken by anyone on almost any subject matter. Practically speaking, such inquiry often demands a vast fund of background knowledge and a sizable team of cooperating inquirers, not to mention sophisticated equipment; this is because human knowledge has [4] already progressed so far. But at root what is needed for scientific inquiry is just receptivity to data, skill in reasoning, and yearning for truth. Admittedly, ingenuity can help too.

科学共同体并不是一个排他性的组织。原则上，任何人都可以对几乎任何题材进行科学研究，这也是“科学研究”一词最恰当、最宽泛的意义所要求的。从实践上讲，这种研究常常需要掌握大量的背景知识，需要许多研究者的合作，不消说也需要复杂的设备；这是因为人类知识的深度和广度已经有了长足的发展。[4]但从根本上讲，科学研究所要求的，只是吸收材料的能力，推理的技巧和对真理的追求。当然，机灵也是有帮助的。

Of course science is not the only discipline that brings enlightenment; literature and the arts teach us too. One pities the person who derives nothing from poetry or music. It has been supposed by many that appreciation of the arts bears little relation to knowledge as such, as if appreciation springs from the heart while knowledge resides in the brain. But some recent writers, like Nelson Goodman, have argued convincingly that such appreciation has a much more substantial cognitive component than has been widely realized. "Cognitive", we note, comes from a Latin word for acquiring knowledge or coming to know.

当然，科学并不是惟一能带来启迪的领域。文学和艺术也可以给我们以教益。如果一个人从诗歌和音乐中一无所得，那是令人惋惜的。许多人认为，艺术鉴赏与真正的知识没有多少关系，仿佛艺术鉴赏来自情感，而知识则来自理性。但一些当代作家，如纳尔逊·古德曼，有说服力地论证说，这种鉴赏所具有的实质性的认知成分，要比一般人所意识到的多得多。我们注意到，“认知”一词来自拉丁词[4]，意为获取知识或开始知道。

But even as light is opposed by darkness, science and reason have their enemies. Superstition and belief in magic are as old as man himself; for the intransigence（不妥协） of facts and our limitations in controlling them can be powerfully hard to take. Add to this the reflection that we are in an age when it is popular to distrust whatever is seen as the established view or the Establishment, and it is no wonder that anti-rational attitudes and doctrines are mustering so much support. Still, we can understand what encourages the anti-rationalist turn without losing our zeal for opposing it. A current Continuing Education catalogue offers a course description, under the heading "Philosophy", that typifies the dark view at its darkest: "Children of science that we are, we have based our cultural patterns on logic, on the cognitive, on the verifiable. But more and more there has crept into current research and study the haunting（不易忘怀的） suggestion that there are other kinds of knowledge unfathomable by our cognition, other ways of knowing beyond the limits of our logic, which are deserving of our serious attention." Now "knowledge [5] unfathomable by our cognition" is simply incoherent, as attention to the words makes clear. Moreover, all that creeps is not gold. One wonders how many students enrolled.

但是，就像黑暗是光明的对立面一样，科学和理性也有它们的敌人。迷信和对魔术的信仰，和人类自身的历史一样悠久；因为桀骜不驯的事实和我们在控制它们方面的局限性，都是令人难以忍受的。起作用的还有下面这个反思性的结论：我们的时代是一个盛行怀疑任何占统治地位的观点和占统治地位的集团的时代。难怪反理性的立场和学说能赢得这么多的支持了。但是，理解反理性主义潮流兴起的原因，并不是要丧失反对它的斗志。作为一个反科学的黑暗观点的样本，我们来看下面这则出现在一个继续教育目录中的“哲学”课程描述：“作为深受科学影响的人，我们把我们的文化模式建立在逻辑、认知和可证实性的基础上。但是，有认知不能理解的其他种类的知识，有不受逻辑限制的其他认识方法，它们值得我们严肃地予以注意；这个挥之不去的想法已经越来越多地进入当前的研究。”[5]首先，通过词义分析可以明显地看出，“认知不能理解的知识”根本说不通。另外，进入的东西并不都是金子。不知道有多少学生注了册。

Not that soberly seeking to learn is all there should be; let there be fun and games as well. But let it also be clear where the boundaries are. A person might have a moderately amusing time playing with a ouija board, but if he drifts into the belief that it is a bona fide avenue to discovery then something has gone amiss. We will not pursue the possible socio-benefits of anti-rational doctrines; in our eyes, much better escapes from reality are available, if that's what's wanted. In the chapters ahead we will be interested in the ways of acquiring and sustaining right beliefs, be they pleasant or painful.

并不是说只能有严肃的求知，也应该有找乐和游戏。但要清楚它们的不同范围。一个人可以花上适度的时间玩灵乩板，但如果他不知不觉地认定，灵乩板是有所发现的真正途径，那他就步入歧途了。我们不拟探讨反理性的学说可能有的社会效益；我们认为，如果需要的话，也有比这更好的逃避现实的方法。在下面各章里，我们感兴趣的是如何获致和维护正确的信念，不管它们带来的是快乐还是痛苦。

The avowedly anti-rational doctrines are fairly easy to spot; what can be harder is seeing which doctrines are only masquerading as（伪装成） science. There has been a proliferation of masqueraders of late, though the most renowned, astrology and numerology, have been with us since antiquity. But now there are biorhythms and engrams to bolster a store already bulging with orgone boxes and dowsing rods, to cite just a few pretenders. And each elaborate doctrine has or has had its swarm of devout followers. How does this happen, if the doctrines are so wrong?

公然反理性的学说并不难于看出；较难识别的是那些假冒科学的学说。伪科学近来层出不穷，尽管盛名者如星占学和数字占卦学，从远古时候起就一直与我们形影相随。伪科学的仓库里本已装满了奥根盒子和占卜杖，现在又被塞进了生物节律和记忆印迹。这里所列举的还只是九牛一毛。每一种精心炮制的学说都有着或曾经有过大量虔诚的追随者。如果这些学说真是大错特错，这种情况是如何发生的呢？ 

The basic reasons are fairly obvious. For one thing, much science has grown so sophisticated that its practice is out of reach for most of us. To be a solid state physicist or nuclear biologist you need years of training; nor do you need much less for medicine or experimental psychology. Accordingly, what we hear from specialists in such fields is often hard for us to comprehend. It is as if they speak a different language. But even more to the point, for all their alleged expertise and renown there are basic questions that they are unable to answer-conspicuously on such vital subjects as disease and emotional disorder. [6] Ignorance on these matters can be frightening. And the response to fright is frequently to pursue whatever course offers hope of relief from it, without pausing to examine credentials.

基本原因是相当明显的。首先，许多科学已走向复杂化，其实践对大多数人是深不可及的。要成为固态物理学或核生物学方面的专家，你需要接受多年的训练，医学和实验心理学方面的情况也差不多。因此，我们常常很难听懂这些领域的专家所说的东西，就仿佛他们说的是天书一样。但更切中要害的是，虽然他们是大名鼎鼎的专家，有许多基本问题，包括像疾病和情感失调这样显眼的问题，他们仍是无法解答。[6]在这些问题上的无知常常会带来恐惧。而对恐惧的通常反应则是寻找解脱恐惧的方法，而不去追究方法提供者的资格。

And so come the cults, claiming to meet the needs that science has thus far failed to meet-and offering the prospective inductee a place on the ground floor. Some cults may be harmless enough, but whenever false doctrine is propagated there is some cost. Many such doctrines are dressed up as sciences in their own right. For even though established science may be distrusted, "science" is still a thumbs-up word for most people. So we find many of these theories borrowing liberally from genuine science, and many more using terms that sound, to the uninitiated, like the stuff of which true science is made. Now many of the bogus doctrines are actually unintelligible; their seeming content simply vanishes when closely scrutinized. But given the incomprehensibility of so much genuine science for so many of us, that very unintelligibility can be mistaken as a sign of authenticity. Alas, it can even inspire reverence.

各种异端就是这样出笼的，它们声称它们能满足科学迄今为止未能满足的需要，并为跃跃欲试者预备了创始成员的地位。它们中的一些可能几近于无害，但只要错误的学说传播开来，总会要付出一些代价。许多这类学说还使自己披上了科学的外衣。虽然占统治地位的科学可能会被怀疑，“科学”仍是一个绝大多数人赞许的字眼。所以我们看到，许多这类理论随意借用科学里的东西，还有许多这类理论所使用的术语，在外行人看来就像是真正的科学术语。许多伪学说实际上是不可理喻的；它们看上去所具有的内容在经过仔细审查后就消失得无影无踪了。但考虑到有那么多的真科学，我们好多人也并不能理解，那种不可理喻可能会被误认为可靠的标志。天哪，它可能还会引起尊重呢！

Often such doctrines are accompanied by defiant attacks on the scientific establishment. Science is said to be in the hands of vested interests. Now there have indeed been vested interests that have blocked progress; so such attacks can strike a responsive chord. But there seems to be no end to how far such accusations can go. Not long ago there was a pamphlet available that "proved" п to be expressible as a fraction. The scientific aristocracy, so it claimed, had had its purposes in suppressing this result. But now, for a small price, the truth was out.

通常，这类学说都伴随有对科学权威的放肆的攻击。据说科学被控制在既得利益集团的手中。确实有阻碍进步的既得利益集团；所以这样的攻击能够引起某种共鸣。但是这样的谴责似乎是无边无际的。不久前，有这样一本小册子，它“证明”了π可以表示为一个分数。它声称，科学界的权贵集团出于自身的目的压制了这个结果。但好在这里的真相无需大费周章就能弄清楚。

When it is a mathematical truth that is assailed there is likely to be a definitive way of settling the issue; so, happily, it is with п. For many doctrines, though, there is this protective argument: you (pointing to the follower [7] of the scientific establishment) can't disprove it! And to be sure, many of these theories that lie on or beyond the fringe of believability cannot be definitively shown to be wrong. Indeed many of them are cast in terms that are so cloudy that it is hard to11 know what would count as a refutation of them; for they are not intelligible in the first place. And here the naivete of the believer may blend with his instinct for giant-killing. He thinks that the fact that his belief can't be knocked all the way over is additional ground for embracing it; and he may rejoice in finding that all the mighty scientists can't put him down. A victory, of sorts, over those in power.

当被攻击的是一条数学真理时，多半会有解决争议的明确方法；幸运的是，π的情况正是如此。但是，在许多伪学说中，有这样一种防御性的论点：你（指正统科学的追随者）驳不倒它！[7]必须承认，许多位于或越出可信性边缘的这类理论，不能确定地证明其错误。确实，许多这类理论使用含混的术语，本身就是不可理喻的，所以很难知道什么算得上是对它们的反驳。在这里，它们的信奉者可能会将幼稚和击败强敌的本能融合起来。他认为他的信念不能被完全击倒这一事实是接受它的又一个根据；他甚至会因为发现所有强大的科学家都不能打败他，而感到欢欣鼓舞。这有一点儿像是对当权者的胜利。

Many theories, good and bad, do not admit of absolute proof or disproof; we will soon be stressing some of the reasons why this is so. Sadly, it is not just false science that has wantonly traded on this. A few years ago there were large advertisements in major newspapers in which cigarette manufacturers proudly announced that they were about to have independent researchers prove that there was not, after all, any causal connection between cigaret smoking and lung cancer. Evidence amassed in support of the connection was already overwhelming, and it should have been acknowledged as such. But, grasping at the realization that a causal connection had not been shown to exist with absolute certainty, these advertisers were magnifying the less than reasonable residual doubt into a proclamation of confidence in the opposite claim. Moreover, the very attitude of proper science was perverted by what they promised; for proper science aims at truth wherever it lies, rather than at support for a profitable industry.

许多理论，无论好坏，并不能获得绝对的证明或否证；这方面的一些原因，我们很快就会予以关注的。令人遗憾的是，肆意利用这一点的并不限于伪科学。几年前，香烟制造商在他们发布在各大报纸上的广告上自豪地宣布，他们正着手让独立的研究人员来证明，在吸烟和肺癌之间并不存在任何因果联系。支持这种联系的证据，经过日积月累，已经具有压倒性，这是必须承认的。但是，这些广告者抓住了因果联系并不能绝对确实地予以证明这一点，并夸大这一原本合理的残余怀疑，以至于宣称应该相信相反的主张。另外，他们所承诺的东西背离了真正的科学态度；因为真正的科学所追求的，是不拘何处的真理，而不是为盈利的工业站台。

Our train of thought, we notice, has led us to show some signs of distrust ourselves. And we have all but pointed a finger at some vested interests! Sometimes, we admit, it is warranted. And sometimes, whatever their motives, [8] even eminent persons of science turn out to have been wrong all along. In science, as elsewhere, use of the soundest methods does not bestow a guarantee that viable theory will accrue. Nor, it should be said, does improper method, even combined with the lowest of motives, altogether preclude arrival at truth. But it makes it very unlikely.

我们注意到，我们的思路已经让我们自己显示出了一些不信任的迹象。我们几乎都曾指责过一些特权阶层！有时，这种指责是有充分的理由的。有时，甚至著名的科学家到头来也是一直错误的，且不谈他们的动机。[8]在科学中，如同在任何地方一样，使用最合理的方法并不保证会产生可行的理论。同样必须指出的是，不适当的方法，即使是与最下着的动机相结合，也并不总是不能获得真理。但它使获得真理很不可能。

In the chapters ahead we will broach many of the criteria by which reasonable belief may be discriminated from unreasonable belief. But not only are the criteria not foolproof; they do not always even point in a unique direction. When we meet the Virtues for assessing hypotheses we will find that they require us to look at candidates for belief in multiple ways, to weigh together a variety of considerations. Decisions in science, as in life, can be difficult. There is no simple touchstone for responsible belief.

在下面各章里，我们将提出区分合理信念和不合理信念的若干标准。但是，这些标准不但不是万无一失的，而且也并不总是指向惟一的方向。当我们接触到用来评估假说的各个优点时，我们会看到，它们要求我们从多种角度去审视各个候选信念，权衡各种各样的因素。科学中的决定和生活中的决定一样，有的时候是很困难的。对于负责任的信念，简单的试金石是没有的。

Chapter II - BELIEF AND CHANGE OF BELIEF

第二章  信念和信念的改变

【译者导读：相信并不是一种活动，而是一种行为倾向，即在适当的情况下以某种方式做出反应的倾向。我们不必为我们所相信的到底是什么样的事物而发愁，而可以转向一个更实际的问题：我们相信为真的是什么样的事物？答案是显然的：语句。反信念是指对一个语句的否定句的信念，而非信念则是指对一个语句的真假不作判断的状态；与信念和反信念相比，非信念是更常见的。反信念和非信念在日常语言中的表达是不规则的：看上去的非信念表达式“我不相信如此这般”被用来表达反信念：我相信并非如此这般，而“我不知道”则被用来表达非信念：我对是否如此这般没有信念。日常语言中的另一不规则之处是把“我知道”用作“我相信”的强调式。知识的三大构成要素是信念、真理和证据；提高知识水平的基本途径是提高证据收集的能力和逻辑推理的能力。要把信念的证据与其原因或强度区别开来。从追求真理的角度看，信念的证据最为重要，有大量可靠证据支撑的信念更有可能是真的。信念调整的基本动力是人们在一组信念中发现了矛盾，其基本目标则是消除矛盾。分而治之是一种有效的信念调整策略：认别出包含矛盾的最小信念集，然后系统地评估证据，以决定放弃或搁置哪些信念，并对附属于它们的信念做出相应的处理。】

[9] One's repertoire of beliefs changes in nearly every waking moment. The merest chirp of a bird or chug of a passing motor, when recognized as such, adds a belief to our fluctuating store. These are trivial beliefs, quickly acquired and as quickly dropped, crowded out, forgotten. Other beliefs endure: the belief that Hannibal crossed the Alps, the belief that Neptune is a planet. Some of one's beliefs are at length surrendered not through just being crowded out and forgotten, but through being found to conflict with other beliefs, new ones perhaps, whose credentials seem superior. It is this need to resolve conflicts that prompts us to assess the grounds of belief, and so to turn to such reflections as will mainly occupy us in these pages.

[9]一个人的信念总体在几乎每一个醒着的时刻都在变化。哪怕只是一只鸟的啁啾声或一辆过往汽车的嘎嚓声，一旦被这样识别到，都会在我们波动的信念仓库中增加一个信念。这些是琐碎的信念；它们来得快，但它们很容易被挤出，被遗忘，因此去得也快。有些信念是持续的，如汉尼拔翻越过阿尔卑斯山的信念，海王星是一颗行星的信念。人们的一些信念最终被放弃了，并不是因为被挤出和遗忘了，而是因为我们发现它们与可信性似乎更高的其他信念（可能是新的信念）发生了冲突。正是这种解决冲突的需要，促使我们去评估信念的根据，这方面的思考将构成本书的主要议题。

Let us consider, to begin with, what we are up to when we believe. Just what are we doing? Nothing in particular. For all the liveliness of fluctuation of beliefs, believing is [10] not an activity. It is not like scansion or long division. We may scan a verse quickly or slowly. We may perform a division quickly or slowly. We may even be quick or slow about coming to believe something, and quick or slow about giving a belief up. But there is nothing quick or slow about the believing itself; it is not a job to get on with. Nor is it a fit or mood, like joy or grief or astonishment. It is not something that we feel while it lasts. Rather, believing is a disposition that can linger latent and unobserved. It is a disposition to respond in certain ways when the appropriate issue arises. To believe that Hannibal crossed the Alps is to be disposed, among other things, to say "Yes" when asked. To believe that frozen foods will thaw on the table is to be disposed, among other things, to leave such foods on the table only when one wants them thawed.

让我们从这样一个问题开始：我们相信时在干些什么？并没有在干什么特别的。不管信念波动得有多热闹，相信本身并不是一种活动。[10]它既不像做格律分析，也不像做长除法。做格律分析或做除法是可快可慢的。我们接受或放弃信念也是可快可慢的。但相信本身却无所谓快慢；它并不是在做某件事情。它也不是一种情绪，如高兴，悲哀或惊讶。它不是某种只要持续我们就能感觉到的东西。相信毋宁是一种倾向，它可能潜伏着，可能未被观察到。这是一种在适当的情况下以某种方式做出反应的倾向。相信汉尼拔翻越过阿尔卑斯山，就是倾向于在被问时回答“是”，撇开其他倾向不谈。相信冷冻食品放在桌上会融化，就是倾向于只在希望它们解冻时才会把它们放在桌上，撇开其他倾向不谈。

Inculcating a belief is like charging a battery. The battery is thenceforward disposed to give a spark or shock, when suitably approached, as long as the charge lasts; similarly the believer is disposed to respond in characteristic ways, when suitably approached, as long as the belief lasts. The belief, like the charge, may last long or briefly. Some beliefs, like the one about Hannibal, we shall probably retain while we live. Some, like our belief in the dependability of our neighborhood cobbler, we may abandon tomorrow in the face of adverse evidence. And some, like the belief that a bird chirped within earshot, will simply die of unimportance forthwith. The belief that the cobbler is dependable gives way tomorrow to a contrary belief, while the belief in the bird is just forgotten. A disposition has ceased in both cases, though in different ways.

向某人灌输信念如同给电池充电。电池在充电后若施以适当的作用，会发出火花或产生电击，只要电荷还在持续；类似地，被灌输了某个信念的人若施以适当的作用，也会有某些特定的反应方式，只要这个信念还在持续。信念和电荷一样，其持续时间有长有短。有些信念，如关于汉尼拔的那个信念，很可能会伴随我们终生。有些信念，如我们对邻居的那位皮匠的可靠性的信念，我们可能明天就会在相反的证据面前把它放弃。有些信念，如鸟在耳际啁啾的信念，则由于无关重要而立即消逝了。我们对那位皮匠的可靠性的信念，在明天让位于相反的信念，而鸟在耳际啁啾的信念则被忘记了。在这两种情形下，都有一个倾向失去了，尽管是以不同的方式。

Grammatically the verb "believes" is transitive, like "kicks" or "drives". We say "He believes it" just as we say "He kicks it," "He drives it." This circumstance could tempt one to think of belief as an activity, which we saw [11] it is not. But it can still raise a philosophical question as to the nature of the objects of belief. The object kicked may be a ball or a donkey; the object driven may be а саr or а donkey; but what sort of object is believed? Something intangible, evidently; something named by prefixing the word 'that' to a subordinate sentence. We believe that Hannibal crossed the Alps. We believe that Neptune is a planet. What manner of thing is this believed thing-that Hannibal crossed the Alps? To say that it is just the sentence itself seems mistaken. Foreign speakers, after all, are said to share the belief that Hannibal crossed the Alps, even when they do not understand the English sentence. We also like to attribute a belief to a dumb animal, on the strength of his dispositions. So with the dog who wags his tail at the sound of a car in the driveway. And we sometimes even like to distinguish two beliefs when the sentence is one; for instance, the sentence "I am Napoleon" expresses different beliefs about Napoleon when uttered by different patients. Therefore, one tends to conclude that the things believed are not the sentences themselves. What then are they?

从语法上看，“相信”是个及物动词，与“踢”或“驾驶”一样。正像我们说“他踢它”，“他驾驶它”一样，我们也说“他相信它”。这个情况可能会诱使人们认为相信是一种活动，而我们已经看到它并不是。[11]但它仍会引起一个哲学问题：被相信的事物是什么？被踢的事物可能是一个球或一头驴子；被驾驶的事物可能是一辆车或一头驴子；但被相信的又是什么样的事物呢？表面上看，是某种无形的东西：由“that”引导的从句所命名的东西。我们相信[that]汉尼拔翻越过阿尔卑斯山。我们相信[that]海王星是一颗行星。但这个被相信的事物——[that]汉尼拔翻越过阿尔卑斯山——到底是什么样的事物呢？如果说它就是语句本身，这看来是错误的。毕竟我们要认为，说外语的人与我们一样持有汉尼拔翻越过阿尔卑斯山这一信念，即使他并不理解英语语句“Hannibal crossed the Alps”。甚至不会说话的动物，我们都愿意根据它的倾向，认定它具有信念。对于听到车道上的汽车声就摇着尾巴离开车道的狗，我们就是这样认定的。有时我们甚至在同一个语句中区分出两个信念；例如，不同的病人口中说出的“我是拿破仑”这个语句，表达的是对拿破仑的不同信念。因此，结论看来是，被相信的事物不是语句本身。那么它们是究竟什么呢？

This, like various other philosophical questions, is better deflected than met head on. Instead of worrying about the simple verb "believes" as relating persons to some manner of believed things, we can retreat to the word-pair “believes true” as relating men directly to sentences. We car retreat to this without claiming that believed things are sentences; we can simply waive that claim, and the philosophical question behind it. After all, our factual interest in what some speaker of English believes is fully satisfied by finding out what sentences the speaker believes to be true.

这个问题像其他许多哲学问题一样，最好是使之转向，而不要直接面对。我们不必为简单动词“相信”如何连接人和被相信的事物而纠结，而可以退至使人直接与语句相关联的短语“相信……是真的。”退至这一步，我们就无须主张被相信的事物是语句了；我们可以径直将这一主张，连同它背后的哲学问题，搁置起来。毕竟，我们真正感兴趣的是某个讲英语的人所持的信念，而这通过找出他相信为真的是哪些语句，就可以得到完全的满足。

And what criterion have we for saying that someone believes a sentence to be true? For most purposes the criterion is the obvious one: he or she assents to the [12] sentence when asked. The criterion can fail if the person either does not understand our language or chooses to deceive us. Also the criterion is inadequate to the purposes of a psychiatrist who wants to provide for some manner of unapprehended belief or disbelief. But it is perhaps criterion enough for us.

在说一个人相信一个语句为真时，我们所持的标准是什么呢？在大多数情况下有一个显然的标准：这个人在被问时会同意这个语句。[12]这个标准也会失效，如果这个人不懂我们的语言，或者他选择欺骗我们。另外，当精神病医生试图识别未被患者意识到的信念或反信念时，这个标准也会失效。但这个标准对于我们可能是足够了。

To be quite exact, "believes true" should be seen as relating persons not to sentences but to individual acts of sentence utterance. For, as illustrated by "I am Napoleon" or "The door is open," one utterance of a sentence can be true and another false. In general, however, it is easier to specify a sentence, simply by quoting it, than to specify some individual act of utterance. So let us continue to speak simply of sentences as true and as believed true, except where confusion threatens.

确切地说，“相信……是真的”使人与之相关联的还不是语句，而是说出语句的个别事件。因为，如“我是拿破仑”或“门是开着的”所表明的那样，说出某个语句的一个事件可能是真的，而另一个事件却是假的。不过，总的说来，指定一个语句——通过加引号就可以做到——要比指定说出它的个别事件容易。所以，除了在会引起混淆的地方，我们将继续径直谈论语句为真或被相信为真。

For that matter, where no confusion threatens, it will be convenient and natural to go on speaking even in the old way of what a person believes, instead of what the person believes true. But whenever we are threatened by the philosophical question of objects of belief, we can gratefully retreat to the more explicit idiom which speaks of believing sentences true, or, ultimately, of believing utterances true.

同样，只要不会引起混淆，我们甚至可以继续以旧的方式谈论某人相信的东西，而不是他相信为真的语句，这样做既方便又自然。但一旦可能产生关于被相信的事物的哲学问题时，我们可以爽快地退回到谈论相信语句（最终是说出语句的事件）为真的更加明显的表达方法。

It is important to distinguish between disbelief and nonbelief—between believing a sentence false and merely not believing it true. Disbelief is a case of belief; to believe a sentence false is to believe the negation of the sentence true. We disbelieve that there are ghosts; we believe that there are none. Nonbelief is the state of suspended judgment: neither believing the sentence true nor believing it false. Such is our attitude toward there being an even number of Paul Smiths in Boston. This is still nothing so contentious as believing the sentence to be neither true nor false; on the contrary, it is simply the absence of opinion.

区分反信念与非信念——即区分相信一个句子是假的与仅仅不相信它是真的——是很重要的。反信念也是一种信念；相信一个语句为假，就是相信它的否定句为真。不相信有鬼，就是相信没有鬼。而非信念则是搁置判断的状态：既不相信一个语句为真，也不相信它为假。我们对语句“波士顿叫保罗·史密斯的人数是偶数”就是非信念的态度。非信念并不会引起任何麻烦，它并不是指相信一个语句既不真也不假；恰恰相反，它是指对一个语句根本没有见解[5]。

解] English usage is perverse on the point: we say, confusingly, the weaker "I don't believe so" to mean the stronger "I believe not.' But the fact is, taking any sentence at random, that belief and disbelief are less usual than non-belief. Are there an even number of Paul Smiths in Boston? Will it rain in Pontiac next Labor Day? English being what it is, we answer "I don't know," because it would be misleading to say "I don't believe so." But our state is simple nonbelief.

[13]英语的用法在这点上是不规则的。我们说出来的是较弱的"I don't believe so" （“我不相信如此”），但实际上表达的是较强的"I believe not so" （“我相信并不如此”），并没有在这两者之间做出区分。但实际上，随便挑出一个语句，对它的信念和反信念都不如非信念常见。波士顿叫保罗·史密斯的人数是偶数吗？下一个劳工节庞蒂亚克会下雨吗？由于英语的上述用法，我们只能回答"I don't know" （“我不知道”），因为回答"I don't believe so" （“我不相信如此”）会产生误解。但我们完全是处于非信念的状态。

The flight to "I don't know" compounds the perversity of idiom, for knowing is quite a special kind of believing; you can believe without knowing. Believing something does not count as knowing it unless what is believed is in fact true. And even if what is believed is true, believing it does not count as knowing it unless the believer has firm grounds for belief. Emily knows that her name is 'Emily', having had firm and abundant evidence of it over the years. We must still count her as knowing it even though she cannot remember the evidence now. But Emily may merely believe and not know that the mayor is corrupt, corrupt though he is; for Emily has read only the innuendoes of the rival candidate.

用"I don't know" （“我不知道”）来表达"I don't believe so"（“我不相信如此”），延续了上述用法上的不规则性。知道是相信的一种十分特殊的情形；你可能相信但却不知道。相信某事不能算知道它，除非所相信的事实上是真的。进一步地，即使所相信的是真的，相信它也不能算知道它，除非信念持有者对他的信念有可靠的根据。埃米莉知道她的名字叫“埃米莉”，因为她这些年来对此一直有着充分的可靠证据。即使她现在记不起这些证据，我们仍应认为她知道她的名字叫“埃米莉”。但埃米莉可能只是相信而不知道市长是腐化的，尽管他确实腐化；因为她只读过市长的竞选对手的含沙射影的文字。

In some aberrant uses that pretend to be especially deep, the words "knowledge" and "truth" become tinged with a mystical aura. There need be no mystery about either one of them. Truth is a property of sentences; it is the trait shared equally by all that would be rightly affirmed. And knowledge, in its clearest sense, is what we have of those truths if our beliefs are solidly enough grounded. As an aspiration, knowledge is in some ways like a good golf score: each is substantially the fruit of something else, and there are no magic shortcuts to either one. To improve your golf score you work at perfecting the various strokes; for knowledge you work at garnering and sifting evidence and sharpening your reasoning skills. Your immediate concern [14] must be with the comprehensiveness and coherence of your belief body. Knowledge is no more thus guaranteed than is the lowered golf score, but there is no better way. Perhaps philosophers have done us a disservice by focusing so much on knowledge and so little on belief.

在一些自诩为特别高深的违反常规的用法中，“知识”和“真理”这两个词被涂上了一层神秘的色彩。其实这两个词都无需被神秘化。真理是语句的一种性质；它是所有可以被正确肯定的语句的共同特性。而知识，在其最清楚的意义上，则是我们对真理的基础坚实的信念。作为追求目标，知识有点像高尔夫球中的好得分：它们在很大程度上都是其他事情的结果，两者都没有魔术般的捷径。要提高你的高尔夫球得分，你就得练习各种击球技巧；要提高你的知识水平，你就得学会收集和审查证据，并提高你的推理能力。[14]你当下所关心的，肯定是你的信念体系的包容性和融贯性。因此，知识并不比被看低的高尔夫球得分更有保障，但更高明的方法是不存在的。哲学家们关注的是知识，而很少注意信念，这其实是在给我们帮倒忙[6]。

Another irregularity of English usage is a hyperbolic（夸张的） use of "know" as an emphatic variant of "believe". "I know the tornado will hit us," uttered with a shudder, carries less conviction than the modest declaration "I believe the tornado will hit us." Knowledge is a laudable aspiration, and speculation is laudable too as long as we are aware of what we are doing. And between these termini, inclusive, there stretches our whole fluctuating spectrum of beliefs.

英语用法中的另一不规则之处是，“知道”可夸张地用做“相信”的强调式。“我知道龙卷风要袭击我们了”，战栗地说出的这句话，并不见得比一句平和的“我相信龙卷风要袭击我们了”来得有自信。只要我们清楚自己在做什么，知识是值得称赞的追求，猜想也同样值得称赞。我们全部种类的信念，都介于知识和猜想这两端之间（包含这两端）。

A person need never have assessed the evidence for anything in order to be rich in opinion. On the contrary. Sometimes, sad to say, one even goes on assenting to sentences that contradict one another. This, however, is because inconsistency is not always obvious. We can no longer believe all of a set of sentences to be true once we know them to be in contradiction with one another, since contradiction requires one or another of them to be false. Once we recognize a conflict among our beliefs, it is up to us to gather and assess our evidence with a view to weeding out one or another of the conflicting beliefs.

一个人不需要评估任何事情的证据就能拥有丰富的观点。恰恰相反。有的时候，很遗憾，我们甚至会同意相互矛盾的语句，但这是因为矛盾并不总是显而易见的。一旦我们发现一组语句相互矛盾，我们就不能相信它们都是真的，因为矛盾意味着至少有一个是假的。一旦我们意识到我们的信念之间存在冲突，我们就必须收集和评估这些信念的证据，目的是剔除其中的至少一个以恢复一致性。

Among our beliefs there are some of higher order—beliefs about beliefs—that often guide us in these assessments of evidence. We all hold, for example, that those gained from respected encyclopedias and almanacs are more to be relied on than those gained from television commercials. Further, we agree that what we think we see is usually there. Seeing is not quite believing, but it goes a long way.

在我们的信念中，有些是高阶信念，即关于信念的信念。它们常常指导着我们评估证据的活动。例如，我们都认为，从受人尊重的百科全书和年鉴得来的信念，要比从电视商业广告得来的信念更可靠。此外，我们同意，尽管“眼见为实”这一说法存在着例外，但视觉证据是非常有用的。

Evidence for belief must be distinguished from causes of belief; for some causes of belief can be counted as [15] evidence and some cannot. The cause of a belief may have been some unqualified person's irresponsible remark. It may even have been a misunderstanding on our part of someone's words, or a subconscious association of ideas. Its effectiveness may have been enhanced by wishful thinking. The cause may have gone unnoticed, or have been forgotten; but the belief is there, and by chance it may even be true. On a later occasion we may gather evidence to defend it.

必须将信念的证据和原因区别开来；有些情况下信念的原因可以被视为证据，有些情况下则不能。[15]信念的原因可能是某个不合格的人的不负责任的言论，甚至可以是我们对别人所说的话的误解，或是下意识的观念联想。原因的作用可能还会因我们的一厢情愿而得到强化。信念的原因可能未被注意到，或已被遗忘；但信念仍存在着，而且碰巧可能是真的。在后来的某个场合，我们可能会收集证据来为它辩护。

What we call hunches from out of nowhere probably spring from unnoticed stimulations. In many cases the forgotten or unnoticed cause of a belief may have constituted quite good evidence in its own right, and it is only because of our inability toretrieve（找回）that cause that we have later to seek fresh evidence in defense of the belief. Sounds in the night, not even consciously detected, may have caused our belief that our fraternity brother got back from his revels. The sounds not only caused our belief, but were fair evidence; yet the first evidence we are able to cite may come only the next morning when we see his sports car in the drive.

我们所谓的不知从哪里来的直觉，很可能产生于未被注意到的刺激。在许多情况下，被遗忘或被忽视的信念原因，可能同时也是它的有力证据，只是由于我们无法找回这类原因，后来才不得不寻找新的证据。夜间朦朦胧胧地听到的声音，可能是我们相信我们的兄弟会成员已从狂欢会上回来的原因。这些声音不但引起了我们的信念，而且也是它的合理的证据；但我们却可能要等到第二天早上看见车道上停放着他跑车的时候，才能举出第一个证据。

As long as a belief whose causes are undetected is not challenged by other persons, and engenders no conflict that would prompt us to wonder about it ourselves, we are apt to go on holding it without thought of evidence. This practice is often reasonable, time being limited. But it remains important to keep in mind that cause is commonly quite another thing than evidence. One obvious test of evidence is this: would it still be taken to support the belief if we stripped away all motives for wanting the belief to be true? As long as we see cause clearly as cause and only evidence as evidence, we remain alert for any hint that the time has come when the evidence for one of our beliefs should be sought and sifted. Also we become less susceptible to some of the causes of belief that have [16] nothing to do with evidence, such as the catchiness of an advertising jingle.

其原因未被觉察到的信念，只要没有受到其他人的挑战，也没有造成使我们自己感到不安的冲突，我们往往会不假思索地继续持有这个信念，而不去考虑其证据。这种做法通常是合理的，因为我们的时间是有限的。但是，记住原因和证据常常是两回事这一点仍是重要的。证据是否合格有一种显而易见的检查方法：如果我们去除所有希望有关信念为真的动机后，它还能支持这个信念吗？只要我们清楚地将原因和证据区别对待，我们就能一直保持警觉，从而可以及时捕捉到需要寻找和检查证据的任何迹象。[16]另外，我们也不那么容易受到与证据无关的信念原因（比如朗朗上口的诱人的广告词）的影响。

The intensity of a belief cannot be counted on to reflect its supporting evidence any more than its causes can. We may have little support for a belief tightly held, or much support for some belief that has not yet dawned upon us. In the goodness of her heart some dear old soul may retain implicit faith in the probity（诚实） of her brisk family solicitor, though, if she would only put two and two together, she has clear evidence that he is mercilessly bilking her of her paltry patrimony. Insofar as we are rational in our beliefs, however, the intensity of belief will tend to correspond to the firmness of the available evidence. Insofar as we are rational, we will drop a belief when we have tried in vain to find evidence for it.

信念的强度，和信念的原因一样，也不能被认为是信念的支持性证据。我们对某些被牢牢坚持的信念可能并没有多少证据，而对某些还没有被想到的信念可能却有着大量证据。某个善良的老太太可能会出于好心，想当然地相信她那位风风火火的家庭律师的诚实性，然而，她只消把事情串起来想一想，将会有明确的证据表明：他在无情地骗取她那菲薄的祖产。不过，只要我们理智地对待我们的信念，信念的强度往往是和已有证据对它的支持度相一致的。只要我们是理智的，那么当我们无法找到某个信念的证据时，就会放弃它。

   Often in assessing beliefs we do best to assess several in combination. A very accomplished mechanic might be able to tell something about an automobile's engine by examining its parts one by one, each in complete isolation from the others, but it would surely serve his purpose better to see the engine as a whole with all the parts functioning together. So with what we believe. It is in the light of the full body of our beliefs that candidates gain acceptance or rejection; any independent merits of a candidate tend to be less decisive. To see why this should be, recall the characteristic occasion for questioning beliefs. It was the situation where a new belief, up for adoption, conflicts somehow with the present body of beliefs as a body. Now when a set of beliefs is inconsistent, at least one of the beliefs must be rejected as false; but a question may remain open as to which to reject. Evidence must then be assessed, with a view to rejecting the least firmly supported of the conflicting beliefs. But even that belief will have had some supporting evidence, however shaky; so in rejecting it we may have to reject also some tenuous [17] belief that had helped to support it. Revision may thus progress downward as the evidence thins out.

通常情况下，我们最好将多个信念结合起来评估。出色的机修工对零部件逐一加以孤立的检查，可能也会找出汽车发动机的某些问题。但如果他能将发动机当做其所有零部件共同发挥作用的一个整体，这肯定会提高他的检修效率。这也适用于我们所持的信念。我们决定接受或拒绝某个信念，必须考虑到我们的整个信念体；任何信念的独立价值都不大会起决定性的作用。为了看清这一点，可以想一想信念被质疑的典型场合。这时，一个要被接纳的新信念，与当下的信念体有某种冲突。当一组信念不一致时，至少有一个信念必须被认为是假的而被拒绝；但至于要拒绝哪一个，则仍然是一个开放的问题。必须对相冲突的信念的证据进行评估，从而将其中最缺乏支持的信念清除掉。但即使是这样的信念，又会有它的支持性信念；所以在拒绝它的同时也要拒绝它的某个薄弱的支持性信念。[17]当证据不足时，修改就这样自上而下地进行着。

Let Abbott, Babbitt, and Cabot be suspects in a murder case. Abbott has an alibi, in the register of a respectable hotel in Albany. Babbitt also has an alibi, for his brother-in-law testified that Babbitt was visiting him in Brooklyn at the time. Cabot pleads alibi too, claiming to have been watching a ski meet in the Catskills, but we have only his word for that. So we believe

(1) that Abbott did not commit the crime,

(2) that Babbitt did not,

(3) that Abbott or Babbitt or Cabot did.

But presently Cabot documents his alibi — he had the good luck to have been caught by television in the sidelines at the ski meet. A new belief is thus thrust upon us:

(4) that Cabot did not.

假定艾博特，巴比特和卡伯特是一宗谋杀案的嫌疑犯。艾博特有不在作案现场的证明，奥尔巴尼的一家值得尊敬的旅馆的登记簿显示了这一点。巴比特也有不在作案现场的证明，他的妹夫作证说，巴比特那时正在布鲁克林拜访他。卡伯特也辩称他不在作案现场，他到卡茨基尔山脉看滑雪运动会去了；但这只是他的一面之词。所以我们相信：

（1）艾博特没有作案，

（2）巴比特没有作案，

（3）艾博特或巴比特或卡伯特作案。

但过了一些时候，卡伯特出具了他不在作案现场的证明：他幸运地出现在滑雪运动会观众席的电视镜头里。于是，一个新的信念产生了：

（4）卡伯特没有作案。

Our beliefs (1) through (4) are inconsistent, so we must choose one for rejection. Which has the weakest evidence? The basis for (1) in the hotel register is good, since it is a fine old hotel. The basis for (2) is weaker, since Babbitt's brother-in-law might be lying. The basis for (3) is perhaps twofold: that there is no sign of burglary and that only Abbott, Babbitt, and Cabot seem to have stood to gain from the murder apart from burglary. This exclusion of burglary seems conclusive, but the other consideration does not; there could be some fourth beneficiary. For (4), finally, the basis is conclusive: the evidence from television. Thus (2) and (3) are the weak points. To resolve the inconsistency of (1) through (4) we should reject (2) or (3), thus either incriminating Babbitt or widening our net for some new suspect.

信念（1）~（4）是不一致的，所以我们必须从中选择出一个加以拒绝。哪一个信念的证据最弱呢？（1）根据的是旅馆里的登记簿，这是一个不错的证据，因为那是一家信得过的老字号旅馆。（2）的根据比较弱，因为巴比特的妹夫可能是在说谎。（3）的根据可能有两个部分：一是没有迹象表明这是一起盗窃案，二是只有艾博特，巴比特和卡伯特三人能从非盗窃的谋杀中得到好处。对盗窃的排除看来是决定性的，但是第二点理由则不然；可能会有第四个受益者。最后，（4）的根据是决定性的：那是电视提供的证据。所以（2）和（3）是较弱的论点。为了解决（1）~（4）的不一致性，我们就得或者拒绝（2），或者拒绝（3），从而要么起诉巴比特，要么通过扩大调查范围以发现新的嫌疑犯。

[18] See also how the revision progresses downward. If we reject (2), we also revise our previous underlying belief, however tentative, that the brother-in-law was telling the truth and Babbitt was in Brooklyn. If instead we reject (3), we also revise our previous underlying belief that none but Abbott, Babbitt, and Cabot stood to gain from the murder apart from burglary.

[18]请注意修改是怎样自上而下进行的。如果我们拒绝（2），就得至少暂时地修改较早的支持性信念：巴比特的妹夫说的是真话，巴比特当时在布鲁克林。如果我们拒绝（3），同样也得修改较早的支持性信念：除了艾博特，巴比特和卡伯特三人之外，没有人能从非盗窃的谋杀中得到好处。

Finally a certain arbitrariness should be noted in the organization of this analysis. The inconsistent beliefs (1) through (4) were singled out, and then various further beliefs were accorded a subordinate status as underlying evidence: a belief about a hotel register, a belief about the prestige of the hotel, a belief about the television, a perhaps unwarranted belief about the veracity of the brother-in-law, and so on. We could instead have listed this full dozen of beliefs on an equal footing, appreciated that they were in contradiction, and proceeded to restore consistency by weeding them out in various ways. But the organization lightened our tasks: it focus our attention on four prominent beliefs among which to drop one, and then it ranged the other beliefs under these four as mere aids to choosing which of the four to drop.

最后应该指出的是，分析的组织是带有某种随意性的。在上面的分析中，我们先挑出不一致的信念（1）~（4），然后把其他信念——关于旅馆登记簿的信念，关于旅馆信誉的信念，关于电视的信念，还有关于巴比特的妹夫的诚实性这一可能没有根据的信念，等等——看成是从属于它们的支持性证据。我们也可以将所有这十几个信念一视同仁地列出来，检测出它们所包含的矛盾，进而用各种方法去除矛盾或恢复一致性。但显然，第一种组织方式能减轻我们的任务：它将注意力集中于四个显著的信念，这四个信念之间由于存在不一致性，因此必须去除其中的一个；而将其他信念当作从属于它们的信念，从而仅仅是决定它们去留的工具。

The strategy illustrated would seem in general to be a good one: divide and conquer. When a set of beliefs has accumulated to the point of contradiction, find the smallest selection of them you can that still involves contradiction; for instance, (1) through (4). For we can be sure that we are going to have to drop some of the beliefs in that subset, whatever else we do. In reviewing and comparing the evidence for the beliefs in the subset, then, we will find ourselves led down in a rather systematic way to other beliefs of the set. Eventually we find ourselves dropping some of them too.

上面例示的策略是一种分而治之的策略，一般来说这是个好的策略。当一组信念招来矛盾的时候，可以从中挑出仍旧包含矛盾的最小的一组信念，如（1）~（4）。我们可以肯定的是，无论如何，我们得放弃这一小组中的至少一个信念。在审查和比较这一小组中各信念的证据的过程中，我们会以更系统的方式处理其他的信念。最终，我们可能也会不得不放弃一些其他的信念。

In probing the evidence, where do we stop? In probing the evidence for (1) through (4) we dredged up various [19] underlying beliefs, but we could have probed further, seeking evidence in turn for them. In practice the probing stops when we are satisfied how best to restore consistency: which ones to discard among the beliefs we have canvassed.

对证据的探索哪里是个头呢？在探索（1）~（4）的证据时，我们挖出了许多支持性的信念，但我们其实还可以进一步探索这些支持性的信念。[19]在实践中，当我们对恢复一致性的某个指定各信念去留的方案感到满意时，对证据的探索也就结束了[7]。

Our adjustment of an inconsistent set of beliefs may be either decisive or indecisive. If it is decisive, each belief of the set is either kept or switched to disbelief. If it is indecisive, some of the beliefs simply give way to non-belief; judgment on them is suspended. In the above example, one decisive adjustment would be to keep (1), (3), and (4), deny (2), and thus incriminate Babbitt. Another would be to keep (1), (2), and (4) and deny (3). This would again be decisive so far as concerns (1) through (4), though it would leave the murder unsolved. An indecisive adjustment would be to keep (1) and (4) but simply suspend judgment regarding (2) and (3). On the meager data before us, the most reasonable course would seem to be to rest with this indecisive outcome pending further findings.

对给定的一组不一致的信念的调整，可以具有决定性，也可以不具有决定性。兹说明如下：如果调整是决定性的，这组信念中的每一个都要么被保持，要么被它的反信念所代替；如果调整不具有决定性，有些信念仅仅是变成了非信念，即对它们的判断被搁置起来了。在上面的例子中，决定性的调整可以是保留（1），（3）和（4），否定（2），从而起诉巴比特；也可以是保留（1），（2）和（4），否定（3），这对（1）~（4）这组信念来说仍然是决定性的调整，尽管谋杀案并没有被侦破。不具有决定性的调整可以是保留（1）和（4），而把对（2）和（3）的判断搁置起来。由于我们手头的资料不足，在发现进一步的证据以前暂停于这个不具有决定性的结果，看来是最合理的做法。